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Introduction
To this day, we find ourselves tackling the issue of citizenship as a question “em-
bedded within the problem of sovereignty” first raised by Bodin1. For obvious reasons, 
however, the context has radically changed. Most of the factors which have lent shape 
and substance to this concept are now undergoing a profound transformation. The end-
point of this process is still nowhere in sight. 
We are experiencing a phase of transition which radically affects two categories, those 
of time and space, which have always been a focus of reflection on political philosophy. 
And as in every age of transition, a sense of emptiness and suspension is in the air: the 
presence of something new which is developing and gradually establishing itself, while 
the “old” still endures and continues to influence historical and social reality2.
In facing this phase of transition, a clear awareness emerges: the current global 
disorder cannot be addressed and resolved by reverting to some kind of Westphalian 
order3. Still, borders remain the space that defines a given territory, preserving the ho-
mogeneity of shared space from the intrusion of external/alien elements. To this day, 
frontiers constitute the line separating outside and inside, where “all political practice is 
1. L. Jaume, “Le citoyen: concept indispensable mais obscurci. Un parcours européen en philosophie”, in G. M. Labriola 
(eds), Filosofia Politica Diritto. Scritti in onore di Francesco M. De Sanctis, Editoriale Scientifica, Napoli, 2014, p. 99.
2. K. Jaspers, Über das Tragische, R. Piper & Co. Verlag, München, 1952, p.23. 
3. S. Mezzadra, B. Neilson, Border as Method, or, the Multiplication of Labor, Duke University Press, Durham, 2013, p. 6.
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territorialized”4, and where acceptance and rejection follow well-defined rules and pat-
terns. Indeed, processes of exclusion or inclusion are never completely impersonal, but 
rather represent the outcome of (political) choices and mechanisms that take account 
of a whole range of “relationships of force exercised by institutions and power appara-
tuses over individual and collective subjects”5.
Balibar highlights the cornerstone of the rule of exclusion: “to put it in clear terms, 
we would say that it is always citizens, ‘knowing’ and ‘imagining’ themselves as such, 
who exclude from citizenship and who, thus, ‘produce’ non-citizens in such a way as to 
make it is possible for them to represent their own citizenship to themselves as a ‘common’ 
belonging”6. Even if one were to envisage citizenship as merely a “method” of inclusion/
exclusion, the question of the choice of the criteria of access to the community would 
nonetheless remain a salient political issue, revolving around the definition of the status 
of citizenship –and what this entails in terms of subjecthood– through the consensus of 
the members of society or state sovereignty7.
Setting out from these premises, an attempt will be made to examine the way in 
which political philosophy addresses the double challenge of the “now” and “when” 
posed by citizenship8. The now has to do with the relativity of time, with the contingen-
cy of everyday life, which is always subject to specific “rules” of its own, which are never 
the same; the where concerns the spatial dimension, the physical place in which every 
existence is at least provisionally –and often precariously– rooted.
The time of history, the space of the nation
Only a few years before the French Revolution, in 1784, Kant envisaged a philosophy 
of history directed towards progress, towards the accomplishment of the moral ideal 
of mankind9. The revolution opened up a new perspective on the future and a new 
progressive idea of historical time became entrenched in the collective consciousness. 
What also emerged was a key concept: that of nation. This came to be defined start-
ing from some primary elements with which communities identify –namely, a shared 
4. E. Balibar, Citizenship, Polity Press, Cambridge, 2015, p. 68.
5. Ibid., p. 75.
6. Ibid., p. 76.
7. P. Mindus, Cittadini e no. Forme e funzioni dell’inclusione e dell’esclusione, Firenze University Press, 2014, p. 273.
8. S. Veca, Cittadinanza. Riflessioni filosofiche sull’idea di emancipazione, Feltrinelli, Milano, 2008, p. 54.
9. I. Kant, Idee zu einer allgemeinen Geschichte in weltbürgerlicher Absicht, Berlín, 1784.
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memory, language and blood–. But what ultimately contributed to establishing the con-
cept of nation was its historical definition: “a nation, in the European sense of the term, 
is first of all a place, which is to say a territory with well-defined frontiers”10.
Nationality became the distinguishing feature that separates the us from outsiders in 
a radical and conceptually definitive way. The figure of the foreigner thus took shape and 
came to be defined on the basis of the legal boundaries of the nation, which exclude that 
which lacks similar traits. This is arguably the most paradoxical outcome of the French 
Revolution: the principles of universal citizenship are only confirmed and applied through 
territorially defined, positive law11.
The nation becomes “statalised” to fulfil its historical role. The more it acquires state 
capacities, the more powerful it becomes12. Citizenship is one of the means by which 
the nation exercises its state capacities. And it does so by broadening or restricting the 
criteria of access and membership to the group. Citizenship is the state capacity par 
excellence. It is the means of selection and definition of the body politic. 
The legacy of the French Revolution consists in a notion of citizenship revolving 
around the core principle of national identity. The unity of the nation acquires a nor-
mative value and ensures conditions of equality among citizens13. These conditions of 
equality can only be achieved within the space of the nation, delimited by its frontiers: 
the universalistic perspective finds new legitimacy within national boundaries –citizen-
ship “is hard on the outside and soft on the inside”14.
In the present context, globalism is having a marked impact on the structural ele-
ments of nationhood. Time and space go hand in hand, as do their transformations. 
Laura Bazzicalupo notes: “the present time is not one of progress towards the better, 
but rather a time marked by contingency”15. What is becoming uncertain and contingent 
even more than time is the space of global life. Frontiers are vulnerable, crossable and 
10. J. M. Guéhenno, La fin de la démocratie, Flammarion, Paris, 1993, p. 19.
11. According to Norberto Bobbio, rights are developed through “a dialectical movement which starts with the abstract 
universality of natural rights, passes through the concrete particularity of positive national rights, and ends with the no 
longer abstract but concrete universality of positive universal rights.” N. Bobbio, L’età dei diritti, Einaudi, Torino, 1990, p. 
24. For a discussion of the notion of rights in their historical context, see A. H. Puleo, “Los derechos humanos, un legado de 
la modernidad”, in F. Quesada (ed.), Ciudad y ciudadanía. Senderos contemporáneos de la filosofía política, Trotta, Madrid, 
2008, p. 197.
12. M. Foucault, Il faut défendre la société: course au Collège de France, 1976-1977, Gallimard/Seuil, Paris, 1997, pp. 200-201; 
on this point, see too M. R. Somers, Genealogies of Citizenship. Markets, Statelessness, and the Right to Have Rights, Cambridge 
University Press, Cambridge, 2008, pp. 122-132.
13. L. Bosniak. The Citizen and the Alien. Dilemmas of Contemporary Membership, Princeton University Press, Prince-
ton-Oxford, 2006, p. 97.
14. Ibid., p. 99.
15.  L. Bazzicalupo, Politica. Rappresentazioni e tecniche di governo, Carocci, Roma, 2013, p. 86.
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constantly redefined16; they are turning into the point where the uncertainty of glo-
balism undermines the spatio-temporal dimension of the nation-state.
The dynamics of globalisation are contributing to the erosion of borders and in-
creasing the fluidity of mobility processes. Migrations are once again at the centre stage. 
Border areas are becoming home to the ill-defined figure of the migrant, which tends to 
metamorphose into that of the “frontier citizen”17, ready to inhabit a space, which has in 
turn become uncertain and indeterminate.
The governing of security
Borders have acquired a regulatory function: they are places of admission and ex-
clusions; the places where citizenship originates as a status and where this status is first 
governed18. The most recent migratory phenomena have consistently concerned the 
borders of Europe, turning them into unstable spaces, into a setting for both human 
tragedies and claim-making. Aside from representing the privileged venue for encoun-
tering the other, the “foreigner”, these borders raise a series of key political questions, 
“because they entail the distinction between citizens and aliens, as well as the crucial 
decision whom to admit into the national territory”19.
What appears particularly significant from this perspective is the analytical ele-
ment of governmentality developed by Michel Foucault. This refers to a specific way 
of exercising power, which encompasses three aspects: the institutions enabling the 
exercise of this power; the consequent preeminence of “government” power over all 
other powers; and the establishment of a more or less extensive and specialised range 
of know-hows and apparatuses which find a crucial technical resource in “safety de-
vices”20. The distinguishing features of an apparatus of security essentially consist in 
“a constellation of moral norms, beliefs, police administrative deeds and measures, 
architectural spaces, and regulations and practices serving biopolitical goals”21. The 
lives of migrants are the object to which power strategies are applied and by means of 
which power is held together. They constitute a foreign body with respect to a space 
16. See A. Tucci, “Crossing the Borders of Governance”, in Soft Power: Revista euro-americana de teoría e historia de la 
política, 2, 2014, pp. 59-72.
17. L. Bazzicalupo, Politica. Rappresentazioni e tecniche di governo, p. 73.
18. L. Bosniak, The Citizen and the Alien, p. 126.
19. S. Mezzadra, B. Neilson, Border as Method, pp. 179-180.
20. M. Foucault, Sécurité, territoire, population: course au Collège de France (1977-1978), Gallimard, Paris, 2004, p. 111.
21. L. Bazzicalupo, Politica. Rappresentazioni e tecniche di governo, p. 193.
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whose borders have already been traced22, and are now being called into question by 
a new pervasive presence. 
On the one hand, migrants are perceived as bodies that enter into the power re-
lation and resist from within increasing the power, which they resist23; on the other, 
they appear as elements in an antagonistic dimension of politics. They become the 
“central protagonists in the drama of composing the space, time, and materiality of 
the social itself ”24.
conflicting ethics and unexpected guests
In his Perpetual Peace, Kant expounds upon the concept of cosmopolitical rights, 
founded on the right of visit belonging to every human being. The key factor here is the 
notion of hospitality: every individual has the right “not to be treated as an enemy when 
he arrives in the land of another”25. This perspective leads to a series of considerations. 
The first consideration concerns the nature of hospitality. It is directed towards the 
foreigner, the “other”, who expresses his difference through his unexpected, unforeseen 
and chance presence. This presence carries uncertain consequences. If the other is not 
integrated according to the rule of inclusion, if he does not become “one of us”, he 
runs the risk of existing as a foreigner and hence, of being identified as an enemy26. 
What emerges here is a process whereby, on the one hand, an apparatus is developed to 
remove the foreigner by labelling him an enemy and driving him beyond the frontier; 
and, on the other, a levelling tendency whose explicit aim is to erase foreignness and all 
its distinguishing features. Integration within the citizen body limits differences or even 
tends to erase them completely. Exclusion, by contrast, preserves the identification of 
the foreigner as the enemy and eventually leads to his expulsion.
The second consideration concerns the risk level –which is always high– in the re-
lation between guest and host. The diversity embodied by the foreigner may translate 
into hostility, distrust, a desire to distance oneself, and hence, conflict. The possibility of 
22. On this point, see G. Marramao, “Dal paradigma della sovranità al discorso della civitas”, in M. Failla, G. Marramao 
(eds.), Civitas augescens. Includere e comparare nell’Europa di oggi, Leo S. Olschki Editore, Firenze, 2014, pp. V-XI; see too 
G. P. Cella, Tracciare confini. Realtà e metafore della distinzione, il Mulino, Bologna, 2006.
23. L. Bazzicalupo, Politica. Rappresentazioni e tecniche di governo, p. 193.
24. S. Mezzadra – B. Neilson, Border as Method, p. 159.
25. I. Kant, Zum ewigen Frieden. Ein philosophischer Entwurf. Ein Philosophischer Entwurf (1795), Philipp Reclam, Stuttgart, 
1973, pp. 35-36.
26. B. Giacomini, “Inclusione e ospitalità: due grammatiche a confronto”, in M. Failla, G. Marramao (eds.), Civitas auge-
scens, p. 69.
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this occurring can in no way be foreseen. What risks compromising the relation of hos-
pitality even further is precisely the impossibility of providing any certain answers with 
regard to the behaviour and attitude of the foreigner who is being hosted, and hence the 
possible risks faced by the host community.
This is the classic dilemma faced by King Pelasgus in Aeschylus’ Suppliants, a tragedy 
far removed in time yet still dramatically relevant27. Pelasgus, a Greek king, must answer 
the asylum request made by the Danaids, “barbarian” women who wish to dwell in 
the land of Argos and become citizens. The reason for this is that they have fled Egypt 
in order to avoid having to marry their own cousins, who lay claim to them. The Da-
naids approach the king with twigs that symbolise their status as “suppliants” sacred to 
the gods. Hospitality cannot be denied to them without contravening the will of Zeus, 
which is repeatedly referred to in the tragedy. 
With his heart flooded by “a multitude of ills”, the king voices his worry at the pros-
pect of such great responsibility. He addresses the suppliants with the following words: 
“without harm I do not know how to help you. And yet again, it is not well advised to 
slight these supplications. I am perplexed, and fear possesses my soul whether to act, or 
not to act and take what fortune sends” 28.
Pelasgus ultimately decides to leave things up to the community: “in common let the 
people strive to work out the cure”29. The people’s verdict, as expressed by the citizen 
assembly, is in favour of granting the suppliants hospitality. The women are welcomed 
into the community, even though there remains the risk of war. The demos has ruled in 
favour of acceptance, obeying a principle that was not laid out by any written law, but 
which rather violated the rules which help “distinguish and separate those coming from 
outside from those who are within”30. Addressing the Egyptian herald who lays claim to 
the women, the king makes his pronouncement official: “Not on tablets is this inscribed, 
nor has it been sealed in folds of books: you hear the truth from free-spoken lips”31.
The free will and determination of the people –citizens– opens the door to hospital-
ity and to the welcoming of refugees fleeing from violence. In this case, the pronounce-
ment was a positive one. But does people –gathered in an assembly or, as in modern 
times, voicing its opinion through representatives– always display such wisdom? What 
27. On the enduring relevance of this Greek tragedy, see A. Jellamo, “La tragedia Attica come fonte giuridica”, in R. Siebert, 
S. Floriani (eds.), Andare oltre. La rappresentazione del reale fra letterature e scienze sociali, Pellegrini Editore, Cosenza, 2013, 
pp. 41-59.
28. Aeschylus, Suppliants, pp. 375-380. 
29. Ibid., pp. 365-371.
30. B. Giacomini, “Inclusione e ospitalità: due grammatiche a confronto”, p. 70.
31. Aeschylus, Suppliants, pp. 945-950.
237
would the European “demos” say today with regard to the incessant influx of refugees 
seeking asylum and protection from violence?
The democratic universal as a productive paradox
Without wishing to recall the most recent news events, it is worth stressing an im-
portant and all too frequently overlooked aspect of the nature of democracy32. Democ-
racy carries with it the utopian trait of transparency, while at the same time always 
keeping the field of conflict and tension open. As Giacomo Marramao writes, “democ-
racy enjoys neither a temperate climate nor enduring, uniform light”; rather, it presents 
itself as a paradoxical community, a community of those without a community, ready to 
welcome even “unexpected guests”33.
Democracy establishes itself through the coexistence of particular identities, operat-
ing within an universal dimension. None of these identities can have a hegemonic char-
acter, less still become permanently dominant. The universal, Ernesto Laclau writes: 
“has no necessary body and no necessary content; different groups, instead, compete 
between themselves to temporarily give their particularisms a function of universal rep-
resentation”34.
The premises of democracy rest on what is essentially a paradox: on the one hand, 
democracy presents itself “as something belonging to everyone, something universal”; 
on the other, it produces claims on the part of those who remain excluded from the us35. 
However, it is important to note that this dichotomy “enables the rise of the heteroge-
neous”36, making democracy itself possible.
The claims advanced by those who are excluded from –or do not belong to– the 
demos ultimately amount to a mobilisation for non-particularistic causes and find ex-
pression through the invoking of a universal principle which, as Koskenniemi recalls, 
raises the following question: what is it that we lack?
32. On this point, see L. Bazzicalupo, “Introduzione. La doppia crisi della democrazia”, in Ead. (ed.), Crisi della democrazia, 
Mimesis, Milano-Udine, 2014, pp. 17-29; more generally see S. Petrucciani, Democrazia, Einaudi, Torino, 2014.
33. G. Marramao, “La democrazia, la comunità e i paradossi dell’universalismo”, in G. Marramao, Dopo il Leviatano. Indi-
viduo e comunità, Bollati Boringhieri, Torino, 2013, p. 81.
34. E. Laclau, “Universalism, Particularism and the Question of Identity”, in E. Laclau, Emancipation(s), Verso, London-New 
York, 1996, p. 35; see too the discussion of the same topic in M. Koskenniemi, The Gentle Civilizer of Nations. The Rise and 
Fall of International Law 1870-1960, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2001, esp. ch. 6.
35. L. Bazzicalupo, “Introduzione. La doppia crisi della democrazia”, p. 21.
36. J. Riba, Republicanismo sin república. Filosofía, política y democracia, Ediciones Bella Terra S. A., Barcelona, 2014, p. 103.
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The overcoming of an “instrumental and ethnocentric pseudo-universalism”37 can 
only occur if the capacity for collective action extends to the whole world. Once again, it 
is only democracy that can mediate conflict and channel it towards the accomplishment 
of a common project.
37. G. Preterossi, “La sfida dell’immediatezza. Una riflessione meta-giuridica sulla crisi del diritto internazionale”, in A. 
Tucci (eds.), Disaggregazioni. Forme e spazi di governance, Mimesis, Milano-Udine, 2013, p. 167.
